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Abstract
In this paper we estimate a structural model of search for di¤erentiated products,
using a unique dataset of consumer online search for hotels. We propose and implement
an identication strategy that allows us to separately estimate consumers beliefs, search
costs and preferences. Learning plays an essential role in this strategy: it creates variation
of posterior beliefs across consumers that is orthogonal to the variation in search costs.
We show that ignoring endogeneity of choice sets due to search may lead to signicant
biases in estimates of consumer demand: from 50 to more than 200 percent depending
on informational assumptions. Second, the median search cost is about 25 dollars per 15
hotels; there is also a signicant heterogeneity of search costs among the population. We
perform a statistical test between models of search from known (Stigler 1967) and from
unknown (Rothschild 1974) distribution and nd that our data favors the latter: we nd
a statistically signicant amount of Bayesian learning.
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1 Introduction
In markets with multiple sellers and frequently changing prices, consumers often have to
engage in costly search in order to collect information necessary for making a purchase. A
number of theoretical models, from Stigler (1961) and Rothschild (1974) to Talmain (1992)
characterized the behavior of a rational consumer in such situations: she would make a
sequence of search e¤orts, stopping at the point where the expected benet from another
attempt falls short of the search cost. This process results in a choice set from which a
purchase is ultimately made.
Inference about the consumer demand in such a context is complicated by the fact that
both her preferences and her search decisions a¤ect the likelihood of purchasing a particular
product. Indeed, search decisions determine whether the product is included in the choice set
of a particular consumer, and what kind of alternatives are also available. A static demand
estimation, which ignores the process of formation of choice sets, would generally give biased
results. We see three reasons for this. First, since search is costly, the resulting choice sets
are quite limited. In contrast, a typical demand estimation that uses data on purchases and
market shares, implicitly makes an assumption that consumers possess full information about
available goods. Second, since the optimal stopping rule depends on consumer preferences,
the choice set will be endogenous to these peferences as well. For example, if we observe a
consumer who only sampled one or two goods and stopped searching, this is an indicator that
she really likes what she has found. A static demand model does not account for this infor-
mation and therefore makes a biased conclusion about preferences. Finally, even if consistent
estimates of preferences were available, computing any quantity of interest - such as the price
elasticity - requires the knowledge of search behavior. Indeed, a price perturbation a¤ects not
only the decision to buy, but also the decision to search and ultimately the composition of
the choice set.
In this paper, we estimate a structural model of search for heterogeneous products, using
data on searches for hotels online. We nd that a static model over-estimates price elasticity by
more than 200% if the full information assumption is used, and by 60% if we use information
on actual choice sets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper to empirically
evaluate the importance of accounting for endogeneity of choice sets due to search in estimating
consumer demand. In doing so, we make another step in extending the analysis of search
problem to the case of di¤erentiated goods, in the spirit of multi-attributes approach by
Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1989). This emphasis on detailed modeling of consumer
behavior sets us apart from much of the existing literature on product search, which focused on
explaining observed price variation with search costs, e.g., the "Diamond paradox" (Diamond
(1971)). Consequently, these papers have considered the case of homogeneous products, and
whenever heterogeneity was introduced, it was quite limited. See the next section for a review
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of that research.
From a methodological point of view, our contribution to the empirical literature on search
is the identication strategy that allows to separately estimate three main components of the
search process: preferences, beliefs and search costs. The inherent di¢ culty in doing so is
that a consumer can make a search e¤ort either because she is optimistic or because she has
low search cost, and neither of them is observed. In previous research, a partial identica-
tion was achieved: a search cost distribution was identied by assuming that consumer beliefs
are driven by empirical distribution of prices and, in some studies, by imposing equilibrium
restrictions. Implicitly, this approach assumes that: a) consumers know the true equilibrium
price distribution from which they search, and b) the econometrician, too, knows this distrib-
ution since he observes empirical density of prices. These are strong assumptions, and in this
paper we attempt to relax both of them by estimating a model where consumers are uncertain
about the true distribution and learn while searching (see Rothschild (1974)). For the econo-
metrician, consumer beliefs are unobserved and estimated together with other parameters of
the model. We are able to do so because in our data we observe consumer-specic information
sets and search decisions. Learning imposes a restriction on their joint variation, from which
beliefs are identied separately from search costs. Put simply, the set of observed prices is
gives an indication of consumer optimism, that a¤ects the decision to search independently
of search costs. From the estimation point of view, this is also the rst paper to introduce
Bayesian learning in a model of sequential search1. Since a model of search from known dis-
tribution (Stigler (1961)) can be viewed as a nested version of a model with learning, we can
perform a statistical test between the two theories of search. We nd that the data favors the
hypothesis of search with learning, at a high level of signicance.
Continuing with the methodological perspective, a particular interest in estimating a
search model is to see to what extent this way of thinking about search can explain the
actual search patterns. Previous studies have used only purchase data, which is the nal
outcome of search. Therefore, they were restricted to estimating highly stylized equilibrium
search models that would predict observed distribution of prices and market shares, which is
one step removed from the actual consumer behavir. In this paper our detailed data enables us
to focus on explaining search patterns themselves, and within a model that explicitly accounts
for specics of the actual search environment. This gives us more condence in our conclu-
sions. At the same time, this approach is much more data-intensive and computationally
costly, which limits the scope of search behavior we can explain.
The estimation is performed on a unique dataset of searches for hotels in Chicago, May
2007, at a popular website www.kayak.com. Although this website has many di¤erent search
1As distinguished from literature on the search for experience goods, such as Crawford and Shum (2006), or
marketing literature on consideration set formation, see Roberts and Lattin (1997), where Bayesian learning
has long been an integral part of the analysis. However, the idea of using learning for identication of beliefs
seems new to those literatures as well.
3
tools, in this paper we focus on consumers who use a particular search strategy, both simple
and one of the most popular: to sort hotels by decreasing price. A consumer visits the website,
and lls out a request: city (Chicago), dates of stay, number of people, rooms, etc. Based
on that request, the website gives her an assortment of currently available options. The user
sorts them by increasing price and observes the rst page of results that consists of 15 lowest
priced hotels. At this point, she has three options: leave the website; choose a hotel on the
rst page; go to the next page. Since we allow her to turn only one page, on the second page
the user has either to choose a hotel or leave the website. In our data, we observe everything
that a consumer does and sees on website, in real time: request parameters, page contents,
turning and clicking decisions.
To explain observed decisions, we assume that turning the page entails a search cost,
with can be interpreted as a cost of processing information on that page. Every consumer
is endowed with a search cost that is independently drawn from a common distribution. At
the same time, there is a possibility of nding a better deal among the 15 hotels on the
second page. In response to the uncertainty about the content of the next page, the consumer
formulates a prior belief about the joint distribution of hotel characteristics (price, star rating,
etc), and updates her belief from the information on the rst page. The decision to turn the
page is then based on a comparison of search cost to the expected benet, evaluated from the
posterior beliefs. Further, the decision to click on a hotel (on not click at all) is explain by a
model of utility, together with composition of the choice set. We formulate parametric models
of utility, prior beliefs (common for all consumers), the search cost distribution and perform
the estimation by maximum likelihood. The median search cost is around $25 for a collection
of 15 hotels, or about $1.7 per hotel; there also signicant heterogeneity of search costs among
the population. The estimated prior belief about conditional price distribution, although has
theoretically correct signs, shows less sensitivity to hotels characteristics than price regression.
The estimated amount of prior uncertainty is small, but statistically signicant; at the same
time, the degree of Bayesian updating is economically meaningful, because the rst page of
hotels is very informative about the underlying price-quality relationship. We also nd that
travelers who stay over a weekend are more price sensitive, while those traveling in a group
and/or searching in a shorter time are more likely to click on a hotel now than leave website
without clicking. These ndings seem to be intuitive from an economic point of view.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a review of the existing
literature on empirical models of product search. Section (3) describes the data; in Section
(4) we present our search model and then discuss issues of identication and estimation in
Sections (5) and (6). Results are discussed in Section (7) and in Section (8) we compute and
compare price elasticities of demand. Section (9) concludes. Appendix contains all tables and
gures.
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2 Literature
By this time there exists a large empirical literature2 examining consumer search, which varies
widely in methods applied and questions addressed. A comprehensive review of this literature
is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we only review a small part of it, which is directly
related to our research. These are structural models of sequential product search, e.g. models
that explicitly incorporate optimal search decisions. We also distinguish ourselves from papers
on search for experience goods, such as Crawford and Shum (2006), Ackerberg (2003), Erdem,
Keane and Strebel (2005).
Hong and Shum (2003) use online price data for consumer electronics products and books
to estimate a search model, separately for each product. This paper proposes a method to
estimate a parametric form of search cost distribution from price data alone, without informa-
tion on purchases or market shares. The idea is to use equilibrium indi¤erence conditions of
the type suggested by Burdette and Judd (1983), as identifying restrictions. These restrictions
postulate the distribution of reservation prices in the population, which implies a functional
relationship between search cost distribution and price beliefs. Every observed price is then
represented as a reservation price for a group of consumers, and parameters of search cost
distribution are estimated by maximizing the likelihood of observing these prices. In this
way, it is implicitly assumed that price beliefs are given ML approximation to the empirical
density of prices. Hong and Shum nd that sequential models give rather large search cost
estimates, which seems unrealistic given the existence of price comparison websites. This is
a negative conclusion, but it is also not surprising: in their model, search costs alone should
explain the variation of prices in equilibrium. Also, this is a highly stylized model, which does
not account for sellers heterogeneity, in terms of market shares or marginal costs, as well as
product heterogeneity. In a follow-up paper, Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2008) pro-
pose an alternative estimation method for the non-sequential search model, which is shown
to perform better in their Monte-Carlo experiment.
Babur de los Santos (2008) on search with unequal sampling
Hortacsu and Syverson (2003) study search for mutual nds, whose value depends not
only on price, but also on other characteristics, including unobserved taste shock. However,
all consumers are assumed to agree on their valuation of a particular fund, in other words,
goods are vertically di¤erentiated. Although this is still a strong assumption, authors show
that it ts the data better than the homogeneous goods one. Similarly to Hong and Shum,
consumers are assumed to know the empirical distribution of utilities of available funds, hence
the search is motivated by uncertainty of what location o¤ers what value. The methodological
contribution of this paper is to show that if price data is supplemented by market shares data,
then CDF of search cost distribution is non-parametrically identied at a number of cuto¤
2There is also a well developed literature on labor search, but it addresses quite di¤erent set of questions
(such as recovering equilibrium distribution of wages) - see van der Berg and Ridder (1999) for a review.
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points equal to the number of rms. This is a remarkable result, given that no data on the
search process itself is available.
Sorensen (2001) is perhaps the closest paper to what we do. she estimates a model where
consumers go around local farmacies looking for the best price of a particular drug. Although
drugs themselves are the same, some degree of di¤erentiation is brought by characteristics
of a farmacy (such as location), as well as consumer specic taste shock. Therefore, both
horizontal and vertical product di¤erentiation is introduced, albeit to a limited extent, both
in terms of product attributes and the fact that an outside option is omitted, which makes
it di¢ cult to interpret price elasticities. Prior to search, consumers know the non-price char-
acteristics of available goods (including taste shock, which is observed to consumers, but not
to the econometrician), as well as the empirical distribution of prices on the market. How-
ever, they are uncertain about drugs price at every location, which motivates costly search.
Search decision in this model has binary nature: either examine all locations or only one (the
the closest). Estimation is performed on data on retail farmacy transactions. Since search
decisions are unobserved, they are integrated out together with search costs and taste shocks.
Despite substantial price variation, the predicted search intensity is low, about 10%, and such
e¤ort costs on average $15. However, search intensity varies across di¤erent drugs, it is lower
for one-time purchases and higher for maintenance medications. It is important to note that,
contrary to the above cited papers, the search cost distribution is identied without equilib-
rium restrictions: this is a single agent decision problem, which takes existing prices as given.
We follow this approach in our paper as well.
Sailer (2006) on search for auctions
Conlon and Mortimer (2008) on demand estimation under incomplete availability, and Fox
(2007), related.
3 Data
3.1 Description
Consumers are searching for a hotel in Chicago on the website www.kayak.com. To begin
search, the user submits a search request, which includes city (Chicago), dates of stay, number
of guests and number of rooms. On average, a search request results in more than 140 available
hotels, which makes it a non-trivial search problem. To navigate among search results, users
can just ip through pages, or employ various sorting and ltering tools, such as sorting by
price or ltering by neighborhood. Each search action (ipping, sorting, ltering) results in a
display of at most 15 hotel options. As soon as the user nds a preferred hotel, she can click
on it: this website does not sell hotels itself, so the click redirects the user to another website
where a booking can be made. This sequence - request, search actions, displays, clicks -
comprises what we call a "search history". In total, we have 24 321 of unique search histories,
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and Table (3) represents the most popular ones. Unfortunately, we cannot tell whether any
two histories were made by the same person; therefore, in this paper we treat each history
independently.
Fully structural approach to model the optimal search behavior in this strategy space
seems unfeasible. Instead, we focus on a subset of population who employed a particularly
simple search strategy: those who started their search by sorting by price, then ipped at
most one page, and nished their process by booking a hotel or leaving the website. The
position of this subset in the total population is described in Table (3). To summarize:
(1) Number of consumers engaged in active search: 24321-7029 = 17 292
(2) Those who started search by price sorting: 2664
(3) Those who started search by price sorting and then only ipped: 1436
(4) Those who started search by price sorting and then only ipped at most one page: 1123.
In what follows we refer to group (1) is "general population", while group (4) is our
estimation sample. It consists of 1123 consumers, of whom 848 never turned a page, and 275
turned one page. This represents only 6.5% of general population, and 78% of searchers who
employed sort by price and ipstrategy. Such low number is mostly explained by the large
number of other possible strategies: 10 240 searchers used relatively rare ones. Plus, we are
not allowing to continue searching on the website using other strategies, such as sorting by
distance or by ltering by neighborhood. Nevertheless, as we can see from Table (3), such
strategy as price sorting is the most popular way to start search, after simple page ipping.
For every search history of this type, we observe almost everything, that is:
 parameters of initial request: date of search, dates of stay, number of people, number of
rooms
 number of pages ipped
 contents of each ipped page: 15 hotel options with prices and other characteristics
 clicked hotels
Since a click redirects the user to another website, we do not observe whether the actual
booking was made. See Section (6) for a discussion of this issue. If we observe more than one
click, then the last click is used.
Now we discribe the available data elds in more detail; while the main focus is on the
estimation sample, we also present summary statistics for groups (1)-(3) to, to see the e¤ect
of selection on the distribution of variables.
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3.2 Chicago hotels
A search request for Chicago hotels typically returns 130-140 hotel options, depending on
availability. During May 2007, the maximal number3 of returned hotels was 148; these are
Chicago hotels with online pricing. As we can see from the Figure (2), there is wide variation
in geographical position of hotels. These are not only hotels located in the city of Chicago
itself, but also in the satellite towns (Evanston, Skokie, etc), as well as in the proximity of
airports (OHare, Midway). Table (4) summarizes these hotels in terms of their quality and
location. Hotels in "Gold Coast", "Loop" and "West side" are close to the city center - in the
estimation, they are combined under "Center" neighborhood. Hotels in "SW (South west)"
and "Midway" are relatively far from the center, grouped them under "South" dummy; hotels
to the north side are "North" and a special category is "OHare" - those close to the airport.
On Figure (1) we have a distribution of hotels by their distance to the city center. There
are two well dened clusters, those that are located within 5 miles from the city center, and
those far from the city, between 10 and 20 miles. These clusters are largely accounted for by
neighborhood dummies; also, we try to suppress the e¤ect of outliers by including distance in
the log form.
Unobserved quality is an important issue in such good as hotel accomodation. Part of it
comes from quality standards among di¤erent hotel chains, which we control for by including
a set of brand dummies in the estimation. There is a large number of hotel brands present
in Chicago market, but for most of them the estimation sample has very little or no data
on clicks. Therefore, we include only top 5 hotel brands: Null, Rodeway Inns, Econo Lodge,
Days Inn, Best Western - together, they attract 28% of impressions and 56% of clicks. The
Null brand stands for hotels that dont belong to any chain; all other hotels are grouped under
a default category.
Since we do not observe the total availability for each request, we assume that all N=148
hotels are available at the time of request. This assumption is needed only for specication
of consumers beliefs, as it will be clear below.
3.3 Request types
To start search, the user has to enter a request. Its parameters include: date of search; dates
of stay; number of people; number of rooms. From the dates of search and stay, we can derive
advance purchase, length of stay, and whether the Saturday night is included. From Table
(5) we can see that, relative to the general population (group 1), consumers in our sample
search on average 2.8 days less in advance, and are a bit less likely to stay over weekend (only
by 3%, signicant at 10% level). There are no statistically signicant di¤erences in terms of
3 If one includes hotels without online pricing (i.e. those who advertise themselves on the internet but give
price quotes only by phone), their number raises to around 220. However, by default the website shows only
hotels with online pricing, and only these I use for estimation.
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length of stay or other parameters.
Here we aggregate this request parameters into a number of types, based on advance
purchase (within 7 days, between 7 and 14, more than 14), whether Saturday night stay is
included, and how many people are traveling (one or more).
one person few people
advance nw w nw w total
a<7 121 92 90 106 409
7<a<14 45 36 30 47 158
a>14 90 140 114 212 556
total 256 268 234 365 1123
To summarize:
- people in our dataset either book shortly (within one week of travel) or well in advance
(more than 2 weeks).
- more people stay over Saturday night than not: 633 obs. against 490
- there is almost equal number of searches where the traveler is alone and where two or
more people are traveling
The most popular types are:
- a group of people books in advance and stays over weekend
- one person books in advance and stays over weekend
- one person books shortly and does not stay over weekend
These variables reect the booking behavior of consumer, and as such can be used as a
measure of her "type", in terms of intent of travel, or price sensitivity. For example, one could
argue that people who stay over the weekend are more likely to belong to leisure travelers; the
same could be thought of those who search well in advance. In this paper I test the empirical
validity of this argument, by including request parameters into the utility of outside option.
3.4 Searching and clicking activity
In this model, we assume that consumer can turn at most one page, after she sorts results by
price. As a result, the average length of search in the estimation sample is 1.3 pages. The
table below compares this number to other groups:
group1 group2 group3 group4 T1-4
mean 3.91 3.52 1.87 1.30 87.76
sd 3.36 3.18 1.34 0.51
Among the general population, the search intensity is signicantly higher than in the
estimation sample. Note, however, that most of the di¤erence is not the result of our restriction
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on the number of pages: compare the mean in group 3 that has no such restriction to the
mean in group 1, which is a general population. The limited search is probably the result of a
reliance on a price sorting as a search strategy; indeed, people who search for 3 pages or more
usually employ several strategies. The table below presents distribution of search intensity
among group 3:
pages turned 0 1 2 3 total
N people 848 275 166 92 1,436
Cumul. % 59.05 78.2 89.76 96.17 100
In fact, 78.2% of people who used price sorting as their search strategy, ipped no more
than 1 page and thus belong to our estimation sample; at the same time, the number of people
who ipped 2 pages is of comparable magnitude to the number of people who ipped only 1
page; as a result, extension of the model to the 3rd page seems to be desirable and is subject
of future research.
In terms of raw click rates, there is no statistically signicant di¤erence between groups,
so we do not report these results here. On average, the click rate is 0.36-0.38, with standard
deviation of 0.48. However, if we break click rates across di¤erent consumers with di¤erent
parameter requests, then some di¤erences appear, as shown in Table (6).Contrary to the
general population, the click rate of people who use only price sorting: a) is positively and
signicantly a¤ected by length of stay; b) no a¤ected by weekend stay; c) not a¤ected by
advance purchase. In all groups an increase in number of travelers has strong e¤ect on click
rate. This is a preliminary evidence that parameter of request may be relevant for consumer
type; to test this idea more formally, we include request variables in the mean of outside
option.
Combining clicking and turning activity, one can distinguish between various types of
demand that hotels on the rst page receive: "fresh" demand (those people who dont go to
the second page) and "returning" demand (those who went to the second page and returned);
hotels on the second page receive "residual" demand. The joint distribution of clicking and
turning is:
no turn turn Total
no click 546 194 740
click 302 81(19) 383
Total 848 275 1,123
Most of the clicks for hotels on the rst page belong to "fresh" demand, 302 out of 383,
while the "returning" demand is negligible (19 clicks only). The rest of the clicks belongs to
"residual" demand for hotels on the second page. However, the amount of that demand is
small relative to the number of people who turn the page: 62 out of 275. These facts will be
helpful in understanding some of the estimation results, as well see below.
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3.5 First page variation
Su¢ cient amount of variation in prices of hotels, observed on the rst page, is very important
from the perspective of identication of the model: holding the quality of a hotel constant,
variation in its price helps identify the consumers preference for quality; holding the set
of hotels on the rst page constant, joint variation of their prices leads to di¤erent posterior
beliefs among consumers, which in its turn helps identify learning aspects of the search model.
Luckily for us, hotel market is characterized by uctuating demand and price-discrimination
strategies (otherwise called revenue management) employed by hotels. This is reected in the
ample variation of prices of hotels observed on the rst page:
var min max mean std
price 32 567 97.44 46.55
nobs 16845
To o¤er some evidence of price variation on a hotel level, on Figure (3), we plot 10%
and 90% quantiles of price distribution (from the rst page data), for each hotel separately.
Although not all hotels (118 out of 148) were observed on the rst page, most of the observed
ones o¤er signicant price variation.
A special role is played by maximal prices on the rst page. According to the search model,
these prices serve as truncation points for the distribution of prices on the second page. This
source of variation in posterior beliefs is necessary for identication of model without learning,
as we argue below. As common intuition suggests, consumers whose maximal prices on the
rst page are already high, should turn less frequently, expecting even higher prices on the
second page. Table (10) presents a summary statistics of maximal prices, separately for
turners and no turners. For those most part, there is no di¤erence between truncation prices
seen by these types; it appears only for very high prices - 90%, 95% quantiles, and the largest
4 price observations.
Finally, do people see structurally di¤erent rst pages? On Figure (5), for every hotel we
plot the share of rst pages on which this hotel has appeared. Most hotels, appear on the rst
page only from time to time (in less than 40% of cases), and only 15 of them appear on every
second page or more often. These are mainly 2* hotels and a couple of cheap 1* hotels. In
other words, there some diversity in the content of the rst page, but it is not as substantial
as price variation.
3.6 Search induced demand
Consumers preferences, as revealed from joint variation of clicks and choice sets, are one of the
central elements of the search model. Here we present some empirical facts that characterize
consumers demand and its relationship to the search process.
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To compare demand across selection groups (1)-(4), in Table (7) we present means of
various characteristics of clicked hotels. As expected, people in group 4 are clicking on hotels
that belong to the lower tail of price distribution: on average, these hotels have lower star
rating and are located further from the city center (most notably, close to OHare airport).
Further, Table (8) gives more detail about conguration of choice sets of consumers, and about
hotels that received most of the clicks. It seems that people who sort by price are mostly
looking to stay closer to airports or places in the South direction. The presence of airports as
strong points of attraction suggests that there is probably a caterogy of travelers who dont
care about proximity to the city center. Also, most observed hotels are concentrated in the
middle of quality range, 2-3 stars.
Table (9) sheds some light on the dynamics of demand, by breaking down clicks for the
rst and the second pages. The question is, when deciding to turn the page, what one should
expect? We can see that on the second page, very cheap 1* hotels disappear, cheaper 2* hotels
lose their weight in favor of 3* and 4* hotels. Shares of clicks change accordingly, especially
notable is the increase in demand for 3* hotels (also some demand for 4* hotels). In terms
of neighborhoods, centrally located hotels (Gold Coast, Loop) gain both in the impressions
and in the demand. An interesting case is the Southwest (SW) neighborhood: although its
share of impressions increases by 5%, the demand drops signicantly. This probably means
that people willing to stay in that neighborhood are quite price sensitive. In terms of airport
neighborhoods, OHare is prevalent on the rst page and Midway on the second, both in terms
of impressions and clicks. A similar story goes for distances: hotels that are located far from
the center (>10 miles) lose in both terms, and they are replaced by centrally located hotels.
In fact, a striking 92% of observations on the rst page are hotels located far from city center,
while demand on the second page belongs in large part to hotels centrally located.
In sum, by turning the page a consumer should expect to see more of higher quality (3-4
stars) hotels, located closer to the city center (by neighborhood or by distance). Sometimes
these kinds of hotels are also present on the rst page; in such cases, their prices can be used
to evaluate the benet of turning the page. Intuitively, consumer should be more willing make
an e¤ort if she sees lower prices of this type of hotels on the rst page.
Figure (6) presents some supporting evidence: it compares empirical CDF of prices of
hotels close to city center (<5 miles), observed on rst pages by turners and no-turners,
separately. One can see that distribution of prices seen by no-turners clearly dominates, by
rst order stochastic dominance. For turners, the mean price of centrally located hotels is
$176, median is $159; for no-turners, these numbers are 198 and 202 dollars, respectively. A
similar picture holds for higher quality (>=3 stars) hotels, see Figure (7). For turners, the
mean price of hotels of better quality is $138; for no-turners, it is 153 dollars. At the same
time, there is no such di¤erence for hotels of lower quality and/or located further from the
city center, even though they occupy most of the space on the rst page. Such dependence
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between prices on the rst page and page turning can be explained by learning: seeing low
prices for good hotels, consumers become more optimistic about the benet of going to the
next page; at the same time, low prices for bad hotels do not a¤ect beliefs because this is not
the kind of hotels a consumer expects to see on the second page.
4 Model
In this search environment, every consumer starts by observing the rst page of 15 hotel
options. At this point, she has three alternatives: a) leave the website without clicking; b)
click on a hotel on the rst page; c) go to the next page of results, which will give her another
15 hotels. In fact, we can merge a) and b) by including an outside option as a "null" hotel,
that is always implicitly present on every page. Therefore, she rst makes a search decision
(turn the page), to gather information about available hotels. Although by turning the page
she may nd a better hotel, it is also costly: we assume that every consumer is endowed
with a non-zero cost of processing information on the second page (the rst page is given for
free). After that, the decision to click is going to be based on comparing the values of hotel
accomodations, including the outside option.
To explain these joint decisions, we need a statistical model that consists of three main
components: rst, a utility model that determines the value of a hotel as a function of its
observed and unobserved characteristics; second, a model of consumer beliefs about benets
of turning the page; third, a distribution of search costs among population. We start with
the model of utility, as it denes the relevant search space.
4.1 Utility
The information about every hotel that is displayed to the consumer includes name of the
hotel, brand, price, geographical location, start rating and amenities. The mean utility from
a particular hotel is a linear function of price, star rating, and geographical position of a hotel
(distance to the city center, neighborhood). That is, the utility of a hotel j for consumer i:
u(pj ; qj ; "ij) = ddj + ssj +
 ! n !n j + ! b !b j + ipPj + "ij (1)
ip = p + pwdWi
- where Pj is hotels price (in hundreds of dollars); qj =

dj ; sj ;
 !n j ; !b j

is a vector of non-price
characteristics of hotel j: distance to the city center, star rating, and a set of neighborhood
and chain dummies. We take dj = log(1 +Dj) - logarithm of distance (in miles), in order to
smooth the outliers, see Figure (1). To capture a possible heterogeneity between business and
leisure travelers, we allow the price sensitivity to depend on Wi - a dummy variable which is
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equal to one if a person stays over a weekend, and zero if not. There is also an additive term,
a "taste shock", or "match value" that determines idiosyncratic taste of a given consumer for
a given hotel. It is observable for consumer but not for the econometrician and its distribution
is Type 1 EV, i.i.d across hotels and consumers.
As we have noted above, in the data we observe only clicks, but not the actual bookings.
Even though a click may not result in a booking (for example, a consumer might learn
something new about the hotel and change her mind), if we see that consumer clicks on a
hotel j instead of hotel k, we interpret it as a revealed preference action: uj > uk (see Section
(6) for a discussion). Leaving the website without any click is interpreted as a preference for
the outside option, whose utility is:
ui0 = out +
 ! o !R i + "i0
- where
 !
R i is a vector of request parameters by consumer i: advance purchase, number
of travelers, weekend stay. The utility model gives us a vector of unknown parameters:
(d; s; p; pwd;
 ! n; ! b; out; ! o). Note that the utility specication (1) does not include a
constant term. This exclusion restriction is necessary to identify out; alternatively, we could
identify a constant term in (1) and normalize out to zero.
4.2 Page turning decision
A model of rational search implies that when making a search decision, the consumer takes
into account the information she has collected so far. In our case, the relevant information
set consists of 15 hotel options observed on the rst page of results. Since prices are sorted
in increasing order, these are the 15 lowest priced hotels among those available. Let uir =
u(pir; qir; "ir) - utility of a hotel ranked r, for consumer i; also, let r = 0 correspond to the
outside option. From the rst page of results, the consumer receives the current best utility
U1i = maxfuirg15r=0, and the information set, 
i = fpir; qirg15r=1. Note that the information
set does not include taste shocks: they are independent of hotels observable characteristics,
and therefore uninformative about the posterior distribution of prices and qualities.
Going to the next page will reveal the next 15 hotels, which will be more expensive, but po-
tentially of better quality. These hotels can be summarized by U2 = maxfu(pir; qir; "ir)g30r=16
- utility of the best one among them. Dene Fu(U2 j
i) as consumers i posterior belief4 about
the distribution of U2 , conditional on her information set, 
i. Then, a rational consumer will
4Let F 0(t) be the true, but unknown distrubution of best utility among hotels on the rst page. For the
consumer, F 0 is a random varible in an innite-dimensional space of probability measures, and G is consumers
belief about distribution of F 0. Using the information set 
i, the consumer i computes her posterior belief,
Gj
i. However, since we are going to take expectations of gains of search, which is a linear operator, we only
need to know one moment of the posterior belief, which is Fu(tj
i) = EG

F 0j
i

(t). In the text, we refer to
Fu as "posterior belief", keeping in mind that it is actually the mean of posterior Gj
i.
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turn the page if and only if the expected benet of doing so exceeds the search cost:Z +1
U1i
(U2   U1i) dFu(U2 j
i) > ci (2)
- where ci is a search cost of consumer i. We assume that the logarithm of search costs follows
normal distribution with mean and standard deviation (c0; c1), and every consumer receives
an i.i.d draw from it. Unknown parameters (c0; c1) are going to be estimated with other
parameters of the model. Note that the lower limit of integration is U1i, since assume search
with recall, i.e. the consumer can costlessly go back to the rst page. We now discuss our
assumptions on consumers beliefs.
4.3 Beliefs and learning
A common idea behind various models of search is the extistence of some true data gener-
ating process that delivers goods available on the market and hence the outcomes of search.
Part of that literature, beginning with Stigler (1967) assumes that the consumer knows this
process; the other part, beginning with Rothschild (1974) assumes that she has only vague
idea about it and learns while searching. In the former case, it is said that "consumer is
searching from unknown distribution". In our case, let # (pj ; qj ; "ij ja) be the true distribution
from which characteristics of available hotels are generated. We assume that consumer knows
the parametric family, but not the true parameter a = a0. In this sense, consumers in our
model are searching from unknown distribution. This formulation stands in between the two
modeling traditions mentioned above, because papers based on Rothschild (1974) typically
take non-parametric approach, such as Dirichlet process for the uknown distribution func-
tion. While such approach is convenient from analytical standpoint, it is less so in empirical
implementation, as it requires a lot of data.
The learning process has a number of steps. Prior to search, the consumer holds a belief
G (a) about the unknown parameter a0 of the joint distribution of hotels characteristics; we
assume that the prior belief is common across consumers. After observing her information set,

i, which is a collection of prices and qualities of hotels on the rst page, she updates this prior
in the Bayesian fashion, to arrive at G(aj
i) as her posterior belief about unknown parameter
a0. This, together with the knowledge of # (pj ; qj ; "ij ja) allows her to nd the distribution of
about prices, qualities and match values of hotels on the second page. In doing so, she takes
into account price sorting: prices on the second page are truncated order statistics. Then,
using the utility model (1), she can transform her posterior belief from the multi-dimensional
space of hotels attributes into the space of scalar utilities, to obtain Fu(U2 j
i). Below specify
the parametric families of (#;G) and the process of updating, but now a couple of comments
are in order.
The assumption of common prior is rather strong; however, allowing for unobserved pos-
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teriors would require additional integration over the likelihood function, which is not feasible
with the current method. One way to introduce some heterogeneity in priors would be to
include parameters of request into the prior beliefs, which is the subject of future research.
Another issue is the rationality of beliefs. In an equilibrium model, the rationality of
beliefs and the rst order conditions of rms prot maximization provide natural restrictions
on the sort of price beliefs that may result from the estimation. For example, equilibrium
model cannot produce beliefs where price decreases with star rating, because that would be
incompatible with rms behavior. In our model, which is a single agent decision problem,
additional constraints may be necessary to obtain estimates of beliefs that are economically
sensible. For example, here we require that the average hotel price predicted by consumers
prior should be correct (see Section (7) for details).
4.3.1 Belief structure
Using the chain rule and the assumption of independence of taste shocks, we can re-write
# (pj ; qj ; "ij ja) as a product of conditionals:
# (pj ; qj ; "ij ja) = fp(pj jqj ; a)H(qj ja)f"("ij)
- where the distribution of match values, f"("ij), is Type 1 EV, i.i.d across hotels. The in-
dependence assumption implies that taste shocks observed on the rst page are not going to
a¤ect posterior beliefs; this is why information set 
i, as dened above, includes only ob-
servable characteristics of hotels. Note that both consumer and econometrician are uncertain
about match values of hotels that may appear on the second page: the motivation is that
consumer i learns about "ij only when she observes hotel j. On the practical side, this as-
sumption5 greatly simplies computations, to the extent that without it our current approach
to estimation would be unfeasible.
We also assume that consumer knows the empirical distribution of non-price characteristics
of existing hotels X = fqjgNj=1:
H(qj) =
1
N
X
qj2X
I(qj = q) (3)
- where the equality qj = q is satised if all components of vector qj are equal to the cor-
responding components of a vector q. Here we do not assume that consumer knows the
identities of all Chicago hotels, because of the uncertainty about unobserved taste shock, that
we discussed above. Instead, she knows the support of distribution of observable qualities and
5An alternative assumption could be that the consumer i actually knows the vector of match values of all
available hotels, ("i1; ::; "iN ), in which case second-page match values will be drawn from a discrete distribution.
The support of this distribution is unknown to the econometrician, so an additional integration step is required.
Our current assumption requires only one integration step, when computing expected benet of search.
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perceives every observed hotel as a random draw from H(q). Also, since we do not observe
the actual availability of hotels for each search request, we assume that N = 148 hotels are
available for every consumer. These are Chicago hotels that had online pricing in May 2007.
Finally, the distribution of logarithm of price pj = ln(Pj), conditional on hotels quality,
belongs to normal family:
fp(pj jqj ; a) = (pj ; a0 + a1sj + a2dj ; 20) (4)
- where a = (a0; a1; a2) is unknown parameter. However, the variance log-prices is known and
remains xed during estimation, at 20 = 0:35, an estimate from a large dataset of hotel prices.
To assess the empirical validity of this assumption, we ran a regression of logarithm of price
on distance and star rating, on a large dataset of hotel prices6, with error terms clustered on
the hotel level. Results are presented in the table below:
Table 1: Results of price regression. Dependent variable is logarithm of price
Coef. Std. Err. t P>jtj 95 Conf Interval
stars 0.23 0.02 9.53 0.00 0.18 0.28
dist -0.26 0.02 -13.71 0.00 -0.30 -0.23
cons 0.35 0.09 3.99 0.00 0.18 0.53
R-squared 0.60
N obs 137000
To test the normality of residuals from this regression, we tried various tests, such as
Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-Francia, skewness-curtosis, and found that all of them strongly support
the null hypothesis. Which is perhaps not surprising, for a dataset of this size. As an
illustration, we include normal quantile plot, see Figure (4) in the Appendix. We also tested
normality of log-prices for every hotel in particular, with the same result.
Using her information set, 
i, consumer performs Bayesian updating of her beliefs about
unknown parameter a and the rst step is to nd the likelihood of 
i, i.e. the joint density
of prices and qualities of hotels on the rst page.
4.3.2 Price densities
From the statistical point of view, prices on the rst page, pir, r = 1:::15, are r-th order
statistics from the unconditional price distribution, whose density and CDF can be found
6To avoid biases due to unequal popularity of hotels, we make a random draw of 1000 price observations
for every hotel. This eliminates 11 out of 148 hotels for which we have less than a thousand observations. This
is a small portion of the dataset, so results almost do not change.
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from (3) and (4):
fp(pj ja) = 1
N
NX
j=1

 
pj ; a0 + a1sj + a2dj ; 
2
0

(5)
Fp(pj ja) = 1
N
NX
j=1

 
pj ; a0 + a1sj + a2; 
2
0

- where ; are normal p.d.f and c.d.f. The joint density of order statistics is a well-known
result (see, for example, David and Nagaraja (2003), pp12-13):
f(pi1; ::; pi15ja) = N !
(N   15)!
 
15Y
k=1
fp(p(k)ja)
!
(1  Fp(p(15)ja))N 15 (6)
Our problem, however, is a bit more di¢ cult, because we need to nd the joint distribution of
price order statistics and corresponding qualities, (pir; qir), r = 1:::15. The following result,
which is an adaptation of Lemma 1 from Bhattacharya (1974) is going to be helpful.
Lemma 1 Hotel qualities qi1; ::; qi15 are conditionally independent given realized prices, pi1; ::; pi15,
with densities H(qirjpir), r = 1; ::; 15.
Proof. From our assumption on price distribution in (4), the relationship between price and
quality is pj = aqj + j, i  N(0; 20). We can present it as aqj = pj + j, and the same
relationship holds for ranked results, aqr = pr + r. Since j are independent of pk, k 6= j,
and mutually independent, the same is true about r. Therefore, when prices are xed, the
joint density of hotels qualities, aqr = pr + r, is
Q
H(qrjpr).
From this lemma, we get joint conditional density of hotels qualities:
H(qi1; ::; qi15jpi1; ::; pi15; a) =
15Y
r=1
H(qirjpir; a) (7)
=
15Y
r=1
fp(pirjqir; a)
fp(pirja) H(qir)
Multiplying (6) and (7), we obtain the likelihood of the rst page, given parameter a:
L(
ija) = N !
(N   15)!
15Y
r=1
fp(pirjqir; a)H(qir)(1  Fp(pi15ja))N 15
For what follows, we need only the part of the likelihood that varies with a and across
consumers:
L(
ija) /
15Y
r=1
fp(pirjqir; a)(1  Fp(pi15ja))N 15
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We are now ready to describe the process of Bayesian updating.
4.3.3 Learning
The learning process in our model is not limited to Bayesian updating. In addition to that,
we have to account for price sorting, whereby the price distribution should be appropriately
truncated; also, our assumption of recall implies that the consumer should not expect to see
the same hotel on the rst and the second page.
The prior belief G(a) about the distribution of unknown vector parameter a is assumed
to be normal:
G(a) = N(0;0)
- where covariance matrix 0 is diagonal. Given information set 
i, the unnormalized poste-
rior is:
G(aj
i) / L(
ija)(0;0)
- which is a non-standard density. For the estimation algorithm to be feasible, however,
we should be able to draw samples from posterior quickly and easily. Even though meth-
ods of drawing from non-standard densities are readily available (e.g., Metropolis Hastings
algorithm), for simplicity we approximate the posterior with, again, normal distribution.
There are many possible ways to construct such approximation, and one of them is
Laplaces method (see Tierney and Kadane (1986)). Laplaces method provides an approxi-
mation to the normalizing constant of posterior density, using second order Taylor expansion
of the natural logarithm of the density around its mode. This involves nding the mode and
computing hessian at that point; as such, it is a much less expensive task than numerical
integration. According to this method, we approximate density G(aj
i) with a Gaussian with
the mean and covariance matrix 1i;H
 1
1i :
G(aj
i) ' N(i;H 1i ) (8)
1i = argmax(log(G(aj
i)))
H1i =  @
2 log(G(aj
i))
@a2
ja=1i
- in other words, the mean of the approximating Gaussian coincides with the mode of true
posterior (it is unimodal), and covariance matrix is an inverse of Hessian of that posterior at
the mode. Contrary to many other methods, e.g. based on minimizing Kullback-Leibler or
Kolmogorov distance, this method is computationally inexpensive and in our case gives good
results: we computed Kullback-Leibler distance between exact and approximated posteriors
for all consumers in our sample, and found it to be within 1% of own entropy of the exact
19
posterior7.
Due to price sorting, updating of beliefs involves the second step: conditional price distri-
bution in (4) has to be truncated from below by the maximal price on the rst page:
fp(pj jpj > pi15; qj ; a) = (a0 + a1sj + a2dj ; 
2
0)
1  (pi15; 20)
(9)
Finally, the distribution of hotels qualities, H(q), is also modied due to the fact that con-
sumer should not expect to see the same hotel on the rst and the second page:
H(qj
i) = 1
N   15
X
qj2X=
i
I(qj = q) (10)
Therefore, the system of posterior beliefs about prices, qualities and match values of hotels
on the second page is described by (8)-(10) and the assumption of EV Type 1 distribution
of match values. Together with the model of utility, this implies a distribution of best utility
from the second page, Fu(U2 j
i).
4.4 Reservation property
Let us return now to the decision rule (2). For the consumer, the inequality is a deterministic
statement: it is either satised or not. For the econometrician, who observes neither rst-page
taste shocks8, f"1; ::; "15g (and hence U1i), nor search cost, this is a probabilistic statement.
For a given search cost, this inequality denes a set in the space of rst-page taste shocks; we
now show that this set has a particularly simple structure. We rst notice that the integral
in (2) depends on f"1; ::; "15g only through U1i. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose Fu(U2 j
i) is a continuous distribution function. Then, the inequality (2)
as a condition on unobservables f"1; ::; "15; cg can be equivalently written as:
f"1; ::; "15; cg : U1 ("1; ::; "15) < u(c) (11)
where u(c) :
Z +1
u
(U2   u) dFu(U2 j
i) = c (12)
Proof. Consider the left side of the inequality (2). From our assumption, it is a contin-
uous function, can it can be re-written as:
R +1
U1
(U2   U1 ) dFu(U2 ) =
R +1
U1
U2dFu(U2 )  
U1 (1  Fu(U1 )). Here we omit conditioning on 
1 for brevity. We are going to vary U1 by
7The Kullback Leibler distance is a mesure of di¤erence between two distributions, P (x) and Q(x). In the
case of continuous distributions, DKL =
R
P (x) log(P (x)=Q(x))dx. For comparison, weve chosen own entropy
of the true distribution, P (x), which is E(P ) =
R
P (x) log(P (x))dx. In this sense, we are comparing to an
approximation Q(x) = 1.
8 In fact, since by assumption the concomitants of price order statistics "(j) have the same distribution as
"j , we adopt the latter notation for clarity of exposition.
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changing only f"1; ::; "15g: in this way, Fu(U2 ) will not be a¤ected. Taking the derivative with
respect to U1 , we obtain:  U1 fu(U1 )   1 + Fu(U1 ) + U1 fu(U1 ) = Fu(U1 )   1, which is less
than zero provided U1 < +1. That is, the left side of (2) is a decreasing function of U1 . At
U1 =  1, its limit is +1, and at U1 = +1 it is equal to zero; hence, there exists a single
crossing point where it is equal to search cost (which is strictly positive).
Remark 1 It would be incorrect to interpret this result as a reservation property of the de-
cision rule, because the content of information set 
i is xed. Once we allow it to vary, the
monotonicity of the expected benet of search with respect to U1i will generally not hold. In
fact, such general result is not needed for estimation purposes, as long as econometrician also
knows 
i.
4.5 Likelihood of clicking and turning decisions
For every consumer, we observe two kinds of decisions: rst, whether or not she turned the
page; second, what hotel was booked (including the null hotel). For example, if we observe
a consumer who has turned the page and booked a hotel r 2 f0; 1; ::; 30g, then in terms of
unobservables this implies two kinds of inequalities:
U1i < u(ci)
ir + "ir  ir + "ir; r = 0; 1; ::; 30
- where ir is the mean utility of hotel ranked r on the rst page, or r   15 on the second
page; i0 is mean utility of outside option. Integrating these inequalities with respect to
variables unobserved by econometrician gives us the joint probability of two decisions. These
variables are match values (or taste shocks), associated with every observed hotel and the
search cost parameter. At this point, our assumption about Type 1 EV distribution of taste
shocks becomes very helpful, and for a given reservation utility, analytic solution exists to the
integration problem (see Appendix A).
Before presenting the likelihood function, let us summarize what is observed on a consumer
level. The exogenous variables are 
i = fpir; qirg15r=1 - characteristics of observed hotels on
the rst page, here r - position of a hotel on that page; also, dene 
2;i = fpir; qirg30r=16 be
the contents of the second page. Taking the two sets together, dene Si = 
i [ 
2;i. Part of
this data is missing, because we dont observe 
2;i for consumers who didnt turn the page;
however, this information is irrelevant for explaining their joint decisions9. Clearly, the choice
set is dened as CSi = 
i [ 
2;i for turners and CSi = 
i for no-turners. Finally, we have
Ri - parameters of request, that includes dates of search, dates of stay, number of people and
other variables derived from this data.
9This is not the case if we only had to explain the clicking decisions, where we have to integrate over page
turning decisions.
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The endogenous variables are (Ti; Ci), where Ti = 0; 1 - page turning decision and Ci =
0; 1; ::;#CSi - the position of the clicked option in the choice set CSi, with Ci = 0 for no
click.
From the denition of reservation utility, we obtain: ui = u(1(
i; 0); Ri; ci), where the
(vector-valued) function 1(
i; 0) reects the learning process, that relates parameters of
prior beliefs 0 and data 
i to parameters of posterior beliefs, 1.
Proposition 1 Conditional on exogenous variables Xi = (Si; Ri) and search costs, the prob-
ability of observing consumer not turning the page and clicking on the result ranked r = h
is:
P (Ti = 0; Ci = hjXi; ci) = exp(ih)P15
r=0 exp(ir)
 
1 
15Y
r=0
F"(ui   ir)
!
(13)
- where F"() is cdf of Type 1 EV distribution. For a consumer who turned the page and then
went back to book something from the rst page (including null hotel):
P (Ti = 1; Ci = hjXi; ci) = exp(ih)P30
r=0 exp(ir)
30Y
r=0
F"(ui   ir); if h  15 (14)
Similarly, for a consumer who turned the page and booked something from the second page:
P (Ti = 1; Ci = hjXi; ci) = exp(ih)P30
r=0 exp(ir)
30Y
r=0
F"(ui   ir) (15)
+
exp(ih)P30
r=16 exp(ir)
15Y
r=0
F"(ui   ir)
 
1 
30Y
r=16
F"(ui   ir)
!
; if h  16
Proof. See Appendix.
The results of this proposition provide some insight why static demand estimates are incon-
sistent, if choice sets are generated by search. Observe that for those consumers who clicked
on the rst page (including outside option), the likelihood contributions have a multiplicative
form: P (Ti; CijXi; ci) = P (CijXi)P (TijXi; ci). This means that the likelihood of observed
clicks, conditionally on turning decisions, is P (CijTi; Xi; ci) = P (Ti; CijXi; ci)=P (TijXi; ci) =
P (CijXi). In other words, we can consistently estimate consumers preferences from the rst-
page clicks. At the same time, there is no such multiplicative form for consumers who clicked
on the second page. Therefore, if we include both types of consumers in the estimation, the
results will be inconsistent, because the likelihood function (e.g., the logit form) is misspeci-
ed for the part of the observations. This result is a property of the particular distribution
of taste shocks that we use, and is not likely to hold in the general case.
Finally, every likelihood contribution has to be integrated with respect to the unobserved
search cost. We assume that logarithm of search cost follows normal distribution, with mean
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and standard deviation (c0; c1). The method of estimation is by maximum likelihood; more
precisely, by simulated maximum likelihood, because much of the integration in computing
probabilities (13)-(15) is done using simulations, as described below, in Section (6.2).
5 Identication
Non-parametric identication. We start our discussion with identication of a mean
utility function, for hotels and for the outside option. Consistently with the remark we made
above, we nd that mean utilities of hotels and of the outside option are non-parametrically
identied from rst-page clicks.
Consider all consumers who entered the same request Ri, observed the same rst page, 
i.
Note that these could also be consumers who turned the page but then went back. Let Pih
be the proportion of those who on hotel on the rst page, ranked r = h, with characteristics
(pih; qih); also Pi0 is the proportion of those who chose outside option. We can compute
Pih0 = Pih=Pi0 - the ratio of the two. From (13) and (14), the model predicts that the ratio
is equal to:
Pih0 = exp((pih; qih)  0(Ri))
By inverting this equation, we obtain the value of the function (p; q;R) = (p; q)  0(R) at
the point (pih; qih; Ri). The function 0(R) is identied from  (p0; q0; R) up to a constant,
c =  (p0; q0); conversely, the function (p; q) is identied from (p; q;R0)  (p0; q0; R0) up
to the same constant.
This also gives a non-parametric test of the model: the derivative of (p; q;R) w.r.t R
should not depend on (p; q). Note that we have not used observations for consumers who
clicked on the second page, because their likelihood contributions, (15), do not have the
necessary multiplicative forms. However, thanks to the IIA property of logit demand, we still
obtain consistent estimates of mean utility functions.
Turning to the identication of search cost distribution, dene P (Xi) = P (Ti = 1jXi) -
share of page turners among those with Xi. The model predicts that:
P (Ti = 1jXi) =
+1Z
0
15Y
ir=0
F"(u(0; Xi; ci)  ir)f(ci)dci (16)
- where ir are mean utility functions, identied as above, and 0 is unknown parameter of
prior belief. Given 0, equation (12) denes u(0; Xi; ci) is a known function of data, Xi, and
search cost, c. The product of CDFs is then integrated over unobserved search cost, where
we explicitly use an assumption that search cost is independent of consumers characteristics,
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and, most importantly, of information set 
i. Using denition of F", this can be written as:
15Y
k=0
F"(u(0; Xi; c)  ir) = exp

 
X
exp [ u(0; Xi; c) + ir]

= exp

  exp ( u(0; Xi; c))
X
eir

= exp (M(Xi) exp ( u(0; Xi; c)))
Therefore, f(c) is a solution10 to the integral equation of the rst kind:
P (Ti = 1jXi) =
+1Z
0
K(Xi; c)f(c)dc
K(Xi; c) = exp (M(Xi) exp ( u(0; Xi; c)))
For a given value of 0, the kernel is a known function of (X; c). Although the existence of
exact solution to this equation is hard to check, a minimum distance solution almost certainly
exists. For example, we can use a rather exible parametric model for f(c), with number of
parameters up to dimensionality of X. A collection of prices and qualities on the rst page,
plus request parameters, X consists of about 50 variables. Then, parameters of search cost
distribution and prior beliefs are recovered as a minimum distance solution to the system of
non-linear equations.
Identication of a parametric model. With a limited size of the estimation sample,
- for example, a typical number of observations per Xi is just one, - it is necessary to adopt
a fully parametric version of the model. Arguments for identication in such models are of
somewhat di¤erent nature.
As has become standard, coe¢ cients in the mean utility specication are identied from
joint variation of clicks and the choice sets from which they are made. Another, less obvious,
source of identication of demand parameters comes from joint variation of content of the
rst page and page turning decisions. As we know from the model, it is optimal to search if
the best utility from the rst page is lower than the reservation utility: U1i < ui. An increase
in rst page prices makes the consumer less satised and hence more willing to search: the
10As a reference. All functions in this relationship, P;K; f are continuous and square integrable. As such,
the kernel gives rise to a compact operator K : H1 ! H2 from real Hilbert space (of Lebesgue measurable
functions) H1 to another space H2. Picard has established a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence
of a solution to this equation:
+1X
j=1
 2j j hP; uji j <1
- where positive numbers j are singular values of K, and uj are singular vectors for the self-adjoint operator
KK. This condition seems tough to check.
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predicted probability of page turning increases in a way proportional to price coe¢ cient.
The mean of outside option is identied from the proportion of people who didnt click on
anything, and from the restriction that the linear mean utility specication (1) does not have
an intercept. The coe¢ cients on parameters of requests are identied from the variation of
the shares of no-clickers across consumers with di¤erent combinations of these parameters.
Now consider the problem of separation of beliefs and search cost distribution. The extent
to which it is possible depends both on data and structural assumptions on distribution of
beliefs and search cost. Without the latter, we can rationalize any observed page turning
decisions by choosing appropriate cominations of prior beliefs and search costs11. Therefore,
it is necessary to impose some structure: here we assume common prior belief and common
search cost distribution, from which every consumer receives an i.i.d draw.
In general, parameters of prior beliefs and search costs are identied from joint variation
of content on the rst page and turning decisions. The model presents a restriction on this
variation, see (16) above. From this equation, we see that the e¤ect of beliefs and search
costs on consumers decisions12 is summarized by reservation utility: u(1(
i; 0); Ri; c). The
"learning" function 1(
i; 0) emphasizes that the e¤ect of information set 
i on page turning
depends exclusively on 0, and not the search cost. This function is a weighted "average" of
the prior, 0 and the data, where weights depend on the variance of prior, 0. Therefore,
changes in 0 have di¤erential impact on predicted page turning probabilities of consumers,
depending on the position of their rst page data relative to the prior. For example, an increase
in 0 makes everybody more pessimistic, but those who observed high prices become relatively
more so than those with low prices. In its turn, the variance of prior beliefs determines to
extent to which posterior can be a¤ected by data.
On a more intuitive level, one can make the following argument. Suppose there can be
only two kinds of pages: with high prices and with low prices. Then take consumers who all
have seen the low price page. Given the assumption of common prior, they must have similar
posteriors as well. According to the model, they can make di¤erent search decisions if and only
if they have di¤erent search costs. In other words, the parameter of search cost distribution
is identied from the share of page turners among people who received similar information.
Further, observe that if search cost were the only factor, then share of page turners should
be the same among those who saw low prices and those who saw high prices. In reality, they
are not equal, which can only be explained by the fact that those consumers have di¤erent
posteriors. Therefore, parameters of prior beliefs are identied from the variation of page
turning activity across di¤erent types of rst pages.
11Suppose for simplicity that we observe utilities. Then, for given beliefs, we can make interval estimates of
consumers search cost: ci 2 [0; ci] if she turned the page, and ci 2 [ci;+1) if she didnt. I conjecture that
with longer panel, these intervals can be made smaller, but point identication is not possible.
12Note that the reservation utility only enters expressions like F"(u  (k)), which means that assumptions
on distribution of taste shocks are very important for estimates of beliefs and search costs.
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Note that Bayesian learning is the key mechanism that helps disentangle the e¤ects of
beliefs and search cost distribution. It creates variation in posterior beliefs which serves as
another source of variation in expected benet of search, orthogonal13 to variation in search
costs. Another source of such variation is the non-stationarity of the search problem, where the
sampling distribution is changing over time. Here there are two reasons for this: truncation
of price distribution due to price sorting; assumption of recall (e.g., I do not expect to see the
same hotels on the second page as I saw on the rst one). See Section (4.3.3) for more details.
Thanks to these additional factors, the connection between page turning and content of the
rst page remains. Yet the e¤ect of the recall property is arguably small, considering the
large number of hotels; therefore, in the model of search from known distribution the main
identifying variable is the truncation price. Table (10) suggests that there is a substantial
variation in truncation prices, so parameters of beliefs are still identied, but for slightly
di¤erent reasons.
6 Estimation
6.1 Assumptions for consistency
The estimation exercise of this paper gives consistent and unbiased results under certain
assumptions on unobservables, which we discuss here.
The hotel accomodation is a complex good: it has many dimensions that matter for
the consumers utility, but not observed by the econometrician. It is plausible that such
unobservable characteristics of quality - reputation, for example - will be correlated with
price, creating a problem of endogeneity. In some models of discrete choice, like in Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1993), it is possible to use instrumental variables approach. In this
paper, where error terms enter the model in a non-linear way, it is much harder; therefore, we
need to assume that the unobservable component of utility (1) is uncorrelated with observable
hotels characteristics.
This assumption is related to the issue of clicks versus bookings. In the data we observe
clicks but not bookings, and in fact only a proportion of clicks result in a booking. As
such, a click is a noisy indicator of booking, which brings us to the problem of measurement
error in the dependent variable. In the discrete choice framework, such problem is called
"misclassication", and it is known that it makes MLE estimates inconsistent (see Abrevaya,
Hausman, Scott-Morton (1998)). In our model, when we observe that a consumer clicks on
hotel A when hotel B is also available, we interpret it as a preference of A over B, uA > uB.
A misclassication occurs when this relationship breaks, for example, when the click is made
for reasons other than utility maximization (information gathering, for example). In such
13Conditionally of the search length, of course.
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case, the direction of the bias will depend on what type of hotels receive most of the "wrong"
clicks: if these are higher quality hotels, which is a plausible assumption, then we are going
to under estimate price sensitivity. An explicit modeling of various motives for clicking would
take care of it, but it is outside scope of this paper; thoughout, we assume that a click means
revealed preference.
Note that the fact that a consumer may click but not book does not necessarily mean
misclassication. Consider an example. When the user clicks on a hotel, she is redirected to
another website where she can make a booking but also she can get more information about
the hotel. It is possible that after learning more she changes her mind and does not book.
To formalize this situation, suppose that in the utility model of a sort uij = pj + qj + "ij -
the error term has two compoments: "ij = ij + ij . The rst component is an idiosyncratic
taste by consumer i for hotel j, known to the consumer but not to the econometrician. The
second component is consumers residual uncertainty about the pleasure from staying at that
particular hotel, either due to lack of information or experience. Ex-ante, the expected utility
of hotel i is larger than that of hotel k: pj + qj + ij +Ei

ij

> pk + qk + ik +Ei [ik], so
she clicks. Ex-post, when she learns ij from the booking website, this inequality may reverse,
and the purchase is not made. However, this does not represent a problem for estimation as
long as a click remains a preference indicator, and both ij ; Ei

ij

are uncorrelated with
(pj ; qj).
Further, the no clickaction also represents a certain ambiguity. Indeed, there can be a
number of possibilities, some of which can be correlated with options observed before. The
consumer may decide to call the desired hotel directly; continue searching at another time;
abandon the idea about the trip; etc. In an attempt to control for di¤erent reasons for "no
click", we include parameters of request in the mean value of outside option. Otherwise, we
are assuming that the unobserved component in the value of outside option is independent
from taste shocks in hotels utilities.
Finally, the fact that the estimation sample is highly selected on the basis of search strategy
(which is endogenous), the results should be interpreted with caution. The fact that someone
preferred price sorting (and then leaving website) to everything else means that the distrib-
utions of her unobservables are truncated, if viewed from the perspective of a more general
model. What is needed is a model of choice of a search strategy, but computational di¢ culties
prevent from constructing such a model in a fully rational framework. A possible solution is
to approximate the continuation value of search by a exible function of components of the
state vector (beliefs, current best utility).
6.2 Simulations
To compute the expected utility increase in (12), we simulate the contents of the second
page from the posterior distribution. Every simulated second page, indexed by s, consists of
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15 vectors of utility components, fps(k); qs(k); "skg, k = 16::30, s = 1::MS. The simulation is
performed in three steps. First, I make a random draw of parameter as from the posterior
belief, G1(aj
1). Second, given as, we make a price draw for each of the remaining (N-15)
hotels, conditional on their qualities (see (4)). The hotels with the lowest 15 prices are then
chosen as fps(k); qs(k)g, k = 16::30, as corresponding order statistics and their concomitants.
Finally, the set of "sk are just random draws from EV Type 1 distribution, which is maintained
xed throughout the estimation. At every step, inversion method is used to make sure that
simulated prices are smooth functions of parameters; however, due to sorting, simulated
qualities behave in a non-smooth way, creating problems for optimization that I discuss later.
Since integration is performed over multdimensional parameter, we choose rather large number
of simulations,MS = 1000. Given the content of every simulated second page, we can compute
the implied best utility from that page:
U s2 = maxfus(16); ::; us(30)g
us(k) = q
s
(k) + pp
s
(k) + "
s
k
Having the set of simulated best utilities from the second page, fusgMSs=1, we can numerically
solve the equation:
Z +1
u
(U2   u) dFu(U2 ) 
1
MS
MSX
s=1
maxfU s2   u; 0g = c
- for every value of search cost, c, to obtain an approximation to the reservation value function,
u(c). After substituting this function into likelihood contributions (13)-(15), we numerically
integrate them with respect to search cost.
6.3 Optimization
To summarize, parameters to be estimated are: (d; s; p; pwd;
 ! n; ! b; out; ! o) from the
utility model,
 
0;1; ::; 0;3; 1; ::; 3

from beliefs and (c0; c1) from the search cost distribution.
There are several di¢ culties with optimizing the likelihood function: rst, due to the
employed simulation method, the objective function is discontinuous with respect to beliefs
parameters; second, there are lots of local minima; nally, but probably most importantly,
the computation is quite slow (250 sec per evaluation). Facing these di¢ culties, we settled
on the following optimization procedure: rst, make a uniform random draw of N starting
values from the space of discontinuous parameters,
 
0;1; ::; 0;3; 1; ::; 3

; second, for every
starting value use Newton BFGS method to optimize over smooth parameters; third, take the
best point from the results of the previous step and use Nelder-Mead algorithm to optimize
over discontinuous parameters. Then repeat Newton/symplex step over the best point until
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convergence is reached. This procedure exploits the fact that belief parameters take the bulk
of the computation: if you change them, it takes 250 sec to evaluate the likelihood; if you x
them, it takes 30 sec.
One also needs to decide on the cases when belief parameters go too far from the data, so
that the Bayesian posterior is numerically undened. In these cases, we revert to the prior
and keep track of the proportion of observations that experience this problem.
7 Estimation results
In this section we report estimation results from a succession of models, adding more structural
elements at each step.
Models D1 and D2 in Table (11) present estimates from logit demand models. These are
models of multinomial choice that try to explain observed clicking decisions, taking choice
set as given. In D1, the choice set includes all available hotels, i.e. as if consumer possessed
full information; these are estimates one would obtain in a more common situation when the
actual choice set is unobserved14. In its turn, the model D2 brings in variation in the actual
choice sets to help identify demand parameters. The di¤erence in estimates between the two
models reects the importance of controlling for the incomplete information about available
goods, that consumers often have. In this particular context, the incompleteness is coming
from costly search; in other contexts, such as ticket sales, it could depletion of stock.
Models SL and SNL take another step and try to explain the formation of choice sets
through a search process. In SNL, consumers are assumed to know the true distribution
of prices: their mean belief is obtained by regressing log-price on constant, star rating and
distance to the city center, on a large dataset of prices. See Table (1) for regression results.
In terms of the model outlined in Section 4, we are estimating a restricted version with
0 = (0:35; 0:23; 0:26),  = 0. The last restriction is due to the fact that consumers in
SNL do not perform Bayesian updating during search. This approach follows the tradition
of the preceding literature on product search, where the beliefs structure was xed at some
data-driven level. In this way, we ask a question: given that consumers are extremely rational
(e.g., they know true equilibrium), what can we say about their preferences and search costs?
The model SL relaxes this requirement and allows consumers to have some uncertainty
about price distribution and learn about it while searching. At the same time, in this model
the econometrician does not observe these beliefs, contrary to what we have implicitly assumed
in SNL; therefore, the parameter 0 is now estimated together with other parameters of the
model. During the estimation, we impose a certain rationality constraint on beliefs, namely
that the predicted average hotel price should be equal to its true value. This implies that
14Since we observe only actual choice sets, prices of other hotels are imputed based on observations by other
consumers, with similar dates of search and parameters of request.
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0 2 S where the constrained set is:
S =

(0;1; 0;2; 0;3) :
1
N
X
exp(0;1 + 0;2sj + 0;3dj + 
2
0=2) = p

- where p = 228:39, an estimate from a large dataset of prices. Such restriction is needed to
obtain economically sensible estimates of beliefs.
Table (12) presents estimation results from search models, together with standard errors,
numerically computed using information matrix. Since these models are nested versions of
each other, a likelihood ratio test can be employed to compare their performance. Specically,
we test a hypothesis H0: 0 = (0:35; 0:23; 0:26);  = 0, against Ha: 0 2 S ;  > 0, using
likelihood ratio test. Its statistic is computed as LR=-2*(Lur - Lr), where Lur and Lr are
log-likelihoods of unrestricted and restricted versions, respectively. In our data, LR=29.77,
while 99% quantile of Chi-4 distribution is q99 = 13:28, which means that the null hypothesis
is strongly rejected. In other words, we nd that our data favors the model of search from
unknown distribution.
To illustrate the quality of t, in this table we have average deviances of page turning
decisions,  2 log(p(TijXi)), separately for page turners and no-turners:
SNL SL
turn 2.8079 2.8379
no turn 0.5663 0.5584
As we can see, all search models do much better job at explaining why people dont turn
the page than otherwise. This is due to the fact that no-turners take about 75% of the sample.
At the same time, the contribution of SL over SNL is mainly about why people do turn the
page.
Now we turn to the discussion of estimates in Table (11) and (12). In doing so, we would
like to focus on three quantities of interest: price coe¢ cient, because it is the main factor
of price elasticity (see the next section); combinations of beliefs and search costs, because of
they illustrate the ability of this model to predict search decisions.
7.1 Discussion
Changes in price coe¢ cient across models. One way to interpret the value of price
coe¢ cient is in relation to other characteristics of hotel, for example star rating. As the basic
version of D2 suggests, an additional star brings about 0.84 utils. An equivalent increase in
prices is then (0.84/2.85)*100=29.50 dollars, since prices in the utility model are measured in
hundreds of dollars (see equation (1)). This seems to be a reasonable value: from the regression
estimates in Table (1), the semi-elasticity of price w.r.t stars is 0.23; with an average price of
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2-star hotel being $110, an additional star brings (exp(0.23)-1)*110 = 28.45 dollars of price
increase.
The di¤erence between estimated price coe¢ cients in D1 and D2 is empirically explained
by the availability of higher quality hotels. In the actual choice sets from which consumers
make their purchases we have only the left tail of price distribution: hotels of low star rating,
located far from the city center. In order to prefer the same hotels when better quality ones are
available (in model D1), consumer must demonstrate much higher price sensitivity, which is
what we observe. As a result, D1 over-estimates price elasticity relative to D2 by a signicant
amount, about 130%. More generally, this nding highlights the importance of accounting
for actual availability of goods when estimating demand. The same conclusion is obtained
in the recent paper Conlon and Mortimer (2008), which use availability data from vending
machines.
Even though D2 performs better by incorporating information on actual choice sets, it
ignores their endogeneity and therefore its results are biased, too. Indeed, comparing D2 to
the search models, we observe a signicant drop (in magnitude) of the price coe¢ cient. In a
search model, the role of the price coe¢ cient becomes more involved, because together with
search costs it serves to match page turning decisions15. Holding everything else constant,
a smaller price coe¢ cient produces two opposite e¤ects on the probability of turning. On
the one hand, it increases utility from the best hotel on the rst page, making the consumer
more satised and thus less willing to search; on the other hand, it also makes second page
hotels more attractive, thus increasing benet of search. In an environment where prices are
sorted in the increasing order, one would expect the second e¤ect to dominate: second page
prices are higher, which means changes in price coe¢ cient are applied to a larger base, which
eventually leads to a relatively larger increase in utilities. So we are going to focus on the
second e¤ect, on benets of search.
As we know from the model, the benet of search is summarized by a reservation utility.
To explain page turning, a model must predict a relatively high reservation utility for those
consumers who turned the page, and a low one for those who didnt. In SNL, where there is no
Bayesian learning, price sorting produces variation of reservation utilities across consumers:
those who saw higher maximal price on the rst page will have relatively higher belief about
prices on the second page. Changes in search cost parameters have uniform e¤ect on reserva-
tion utilities of all consumers; therefore, they simply match the average propensity to search.
In contrast, changes in price coe¢ cient produce di¤erential impact: from the above argument,
a lower price coe¢ cient induces more search, but relatively more so for people who observed
higher truncation prices. In sum, price coe¢ cient and search costs attempt to solve problem
of matching between reservation utilities and observed page turning across consumers with
15Of course, all other coe¢ cients of utilty play a role. However, the role of price coe¢ cient is far more
pronounced.
31
di¤erent truncation prices. The result is shown on Figure (9): the upper part are reservation
utilities as functions of truncation prices, for various search models; the lower part are page
turning probabilities induced by these reservation utilities, plotted against actual shares of
page turners. Search cost is xed at c = 0:2 throughout, and quantities are normalized for
illustration purposes. Here, the model denoted by SNL(D2) is a search model with beliefs
as in SNL but with preferences kept at the level of D2; therefore, the di¤erence between two
curves on both plots is only due to demand parameters, and price coe¢ cient in particular. We
can see that for SNL(D2) the reservation utility is a quite steep function of truncation price;
as a result, we see on the lower plot that according to SNL(D2) people who saw prices higher
than 200 dollars should not turn the page. However, this prediction is inconsistent with the
data, as shown by this gure and by Table (10). In reponse to this, we have an increase in
the price coe¢ cient, as in SNL, which makes the reservation utility curve much atter.
Empirically, there are two factors behind the fact that D2s estimates fails to predict
enough search. First, 848 out of 1123 consumers dont turn the page, so D2s estimates
are driven primarily by rst-page choice sets, where a lot of these consumers choose outside
option. Second, from 275 consumers who turn the page, only 62 do it successfully, i.e. they
click on something at the second page where higher quality hotels are availabe. If, on the
other hand, it were the case that a lot of consumers went to the second page and clicked
there, we would see that D2 predicts too much search. Therefore, the sign of the bias due to
endogeneity of choice sets cannot be predicted, it depends on the pattern of demand across
search types.
From the perspective of a static demand model, these facts can be explained by concluding
that consumers are quite price sensitive. From the point of the search model, clicking deci-
sions should be explained conditionally on page turning: for example, if we observe someone
who turned the page, she must be relatively less price sensitive, and vice versa. Therefore,
explanations of the fact that people rarely click on second page have to put less weight on
price sensitivity, and more on other factors, such as taste for quality.
While the price coe¢ cient is an important determinant of benet of search, it is a costly
instrument for explaining search decisions, because of its other role as predictor of clicking
decisions. In fact, any distortion relative to D2s estimates is costly, and as soon as belief
parameters are free to vary - as in the search model SL - we should expect some reversal of
the price coe¢ cient to the level of D2. And indeed, we see some of it in the estimates; as a
result, the explanatory power of SL is better than that of SNL both in terms of clicking and
page turning decisions. While higher search cost decreases reservation utilities in a relatively
uniform fashion, the impact of price beliefs depends on the truncation price, which has ample
variation across consumers, as documented by Table (10). If the truncation price is low, an
increase in the mean belief has stronger negative impact on search than if the truncation
price is high (to see why, think of two extreme cases). This is similar to the e¤ect of price
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coe¢ cient, with a di¤erence that beliefs only a¤ect search decisions, not purchasing.
Search costs, beliefs, learning. The estimates of search costs are quite similar across
models, most likely due to the rationality constraint we imposed. In the basic specication,
the mean search cost in SNL is E(c) = exp(c0 + c21=2) = 0:38, which can be interpreted
in the following way: an average consumer is not going to turn the page if the expected
increase in utility is lower than 0.35. In dollar terms, this change in utility can by caused by
(0.38/1.00)*100 = 38 dollars of increase in the price of the best hotel from the rst page. At
the same time, there is a high variation of search costs among population.
Here we interpet this number as the cost of processing information on a page of results.
To compare these numbers with the actual benets of search predicted by the model, we
perform a small Monte Carlo experiment. Note that expected gain of search, Emax(U2 U1; 0)
is unobserved for us, because of U1 - best utility from the rst page depends on taste shocks.
Taking a consumer from our sample with a typical16 vector of f0; ::; 15g, we make a draw
of her taste shocks, f"0; ::; "15g from EV Type 1 distribution, which gives a value of U1.
Repeating this exercise many times, we obtain a distribution of U1 for this consumer, and,
as a result the distribution of Emax. Figure (8) plots this distribution against the estimated
search cost distribution (ignore the dashed line for now). From this picture, we can see that
the mean of search costs largerly overstates the actual gains of search predicted by the model:
for the chosen consumer, the median gain is only 11 dollars, and in fact the mean search cost
of 38 dollars corresponds to a 90% quantiles in the distribution of benets. In other words,
a single statistic of search cost distribution can be a misleading indicator of gains of search,
and simply because only 25% of consumers actually turn the page.
Nevertheless, even the average expected gain of 11 dollars seems to be a rather large
quantity, considering how little people search. Why does the model predict such high benet
of search? A small example may help understand this.
Suppose there is one good per page, with utilities u1 = 1+"1 and u2 = 2+"2, where
"i are independent, Type 1 EV; consumer believes that 2 = 1, which roughly corresponds
to beliefs in SNL. Now, if we want this consumer to turn the page with 25% probability,
what does it imply about her search cost? First, we nd her reservation utility, u, from the
equation: FEV (
u 1
 ) = 0:25, to be u = 1   0:33; second, we substitute it into (12) to nd
c = 1:02. This result is quite intuitive: the value of an option to turn the page is positively
related to the variance of search results. In our model, where  = 1:28, this implies a cuto¤
value of search cost as c = 1:30. Although the dollar value of search cost will depend on the
price coe¢ cient, this example shows that high values of search cost are not surprising given
our assumption on the variance of match value. As an illustration, consider again Figure (8),
16Typical in the sense of predicted distribution of gains of search. The average gain of search from this
consumer is equal to its average level in the sample.
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curve "Benets 80%": this is CDF of expected gains from search where standard deviation
of match value is reduced by 20% (keeping other parameters constant). As a result, benets
from search drop sharply: the median benet is about 5 dollars now, and almost no one will
turn the page if the search cost is more than 20 dollars.
A natural question is, can we identify  together with other parameters of the model? The
answer is no, because utilities are identied up to a shift and scale parameters. At the same
time, if we divide equation u = pp+ qq + " by price coe¢ cient: ~u = p+ ~qq + 1=p", then
 is identied as inverse of the price coe¢ cient. This gives another way to look at the role of
this coe¢ cient weve discussed above: lower price coe¢ cient is equivalent to higher variance
of match value, which increases benet of search.
Turning to the learning component of the model, the variance of the prior in SL is small,
but precisely estimated: as weve shown above, the model with learning is stronly preferred
by the data. Also, small variance of the prior doesnt mean little learning. Even though the
value of prior variance indicates a high condence that consumers have in their beliefs, the
informativeness of the rst page - which contains the lowest 15 order statistics from the sample
of 148 normal random variables - is also very high. Together with ample price variation on
the rst page, as documented in Section (3), this leads to a meaningful variation in posterior
beliefs. On Figure (10), we illustrate an empirical distribution of average hotel price, predicted
by posterior beliefs across consumers. While most of posterior means are between 200 and 250
dollars, some consumers update to as high as 350 dollars. This means that updating of beliefs
plays an active role in the identication of the model: we see that the estimated prior has has
shifted away from the price regression, its much atter now; also, search cost estimates have
somewhat decreased, but perhaps more importantly, their variance decreased as well.
8 Price elasticity of demand
In the hotel market, the relevant denition of the good is a stay at a given hotel at given
dates. For a consumer, the decision to purchase this good will be determined both by her
preferences and by her choice set, generated during the search process. Because of unobserved
heterogeneity in preferences and in search costs, the individual demand for good X is dened
as a probability that a search by a randomly picked consumer will result in the purchase of
this good. This probability is conditional on extisting prices and hotel availability on the
market, both of which determine the content of the rst and the second price sorted pages
observed the a searcher. In the estimation sample, such data is available only for consumers
who turned the page, which means that we can compute individual demand elasticities only
for 275 out of 1123 of search histories in the sample.
Then we dene two supplementary notions of demand, depending on the level of aggre-
gation. One the one hand, one can break down the search induced demand into a fresh,
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returning and residual demand. Fresh demand is a probability that a consumer will click on a
given hotel on the rst page and doesnt turn the page; the returning demand is a probability
of turning the page, and then going back to click on the rst page; the residual demand is a
probability to click on a given hotel on the second page. Distinction between these types of
demand is helpful in evaluating the role of the position of hotel in search rankings on elasticity
of its demand. On the other hand, one can aggregate demand for all hotels into a market
demand, which is the probability of clicking on any hotel in the choice set, or one minus the
probability of choosing the outside option.
The individual demand elasticities are obtained by increasing the price of a hotel on the
rst page by 1% and the relevant probabilities before and after the disturbance. The iden-
tity of the disturbed hotel is xed both across the models, and across consumers. For that
purpose, I have chosen hotel "Extended stay America", 2 stars, 15 miles from the city center,
neighborhood of OHare - a typical hotel that often appears on the rst page. Table (2)
presents elasticities, averaged over consumers in the sample. These are estimates of uncondi-
tional demand elasticities; in other words, they represent an expected change in demand of
a random consumer in response to price increase by 1%, where the expectation is taken over
possible search histories.
From Table (2) we see that new structural elements added to every model beginning D1,
lead very di¤erent demand elasticities, both in material and statistical sense. Starting from
D1, the model D2 adds information about actual (and endogenous) choice sets; in SNL, we
add the search component where beliefs are xed in ad-hoc fashion; in SL, we free up belief
parameters and estimate them, allowing consumers to learn while searching.
Table 2: Average elasticities of demand for a hotel on the rst page of results,
nobs=275. The second row are standard errors, computed by delta
method. In D2, the choice set consists only of the rst page.
Mdl ind out fresh return
D1 -3.0387 0.0341
0.1516 0.0029
D2 -2.2012 0.0399
0.1789 0.0040
SNL -0.7199 0.0110 -0.7277 -0.7128
0.0345 0.0036 0.1842 0.2124
SL -0.7498 0.0140 -0.7501 -0.7478
0.0832 0.0037 0.2323 0.2041
On one end of the distribution, we have D1-D2 with very high elasticites, between 2 and
3, which is probably not very realistic. The elastictiy of demand in D1 is much higher than in
D2. While most of the di¤erence is explained by the price coe¢ cient, another argument is the
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limited nature of choice sets in D2. It is straightforward to show that, with logit demand, more
alternatives make consumers more price elastic, holding taste parameters constant. Indeed,
the own price elasticity is found as (assuming p =  1):
dqi
dpi
pi
qi
=  pi
P
j 6=i exp(j)Pn
j=1 exp(j)
- which is increasing in absolute value with n. As the number of rms increases, this has two
e¤ects on elasticity. On the one hand, there is a "price-sensitivity e¤ect", when the demand
curve qi(pi) becomes steeper because more alternatives are available; on the other hand, there
is a "market share e¤ect" due to lower quantity of sales per rm. With EV Type 1 distribution
of error terms, the second e¤ect dominates; however, this may not be true for in other cases,
as discussed in Chen and Riordan (2008). On the other end, we have the model SNL with
an elasticity about 60 percent lower than in D2 in the expanded specication, and about 200
percent lower in the basic specication.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we have estimated a structural model of sequential search for hotels online.
Using its results, we have attempted to show that accounting for search frictions matters for
estimation of consumer demand. One implication of costly search is that it results in limited
choice sets. If we ignore this and assume that consumers had full information about available
options when making a purchase, our estimates may be signicantly biased. In our model, we
nd that the full information assumption leads to over-estimation of price elasticity by more
than 200%, relative to results from a search model. This results conrms a general intuition
that consumers are less price sensitive when choices are more limited. Further, from the
perspective of consumer decisions, incomplete information about available goods is equivalent
to incomplete availability. From the perspective of estimation, however, there is an important
di¤erence: while it may be argued that incomplete availability is exogenously given, as in
Conlon and Mortimer (2008), the incomplete information is not. According to the search
model, a consumer stops collecting information if she is satised enough with what was found
so far, which is a statement about her preferences. Therefore, choice sets are not only limited,
but also endogenous to preferences. In our model, we nd that if we account for actual choice
sets but ignore their endogeneity (e.g., the search process), we over-estimate price elasticity
by more than 50%. Unfortunately, the sign of the bias is specic to our dataset and cannot
be determined apriori.
Besides their implications for estimation of demand, our results from the search model
are of separate interest. In this paper, we proposed and implement a way to identify con-
sumers prior beliefs, separately from search costs and preferences. Bayesian learning is the
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key mechanism that helps achieve such identication: it creates variation in posterior beliefs
thats orthogonal to variation in search costs. Although in the current specication freeing
up beliefs does not change demand estimates very much, we believe that in general it is im-
portant to do so, because according to the search model beliefs are one of the key components
explaining search. If they are xed at some arbitrary level, as it is done in the previous papers,
the extra burden of explaining search decisions lies on preferences and not search costs. In our
model, we nd that consumers have relatively at priors about conditional price distribution,
as compared to regression results. The estimated amount of prior uncertainty is small, but
since the informativeness of the rst page of hotels is very high, we nd a meaningful amount
of Bayesian learning. The median search cost is around 25$ per 15 hotels, or 1.7 dollars per
hotel. This is much smaller than what was found in some previous studies, such as Hong and
Shum (2003) and Hortacsu and Syverson (2004).
On the point of models t, we nd that it does a good job at predicting average search in-
tensity, but a very modest job at picking heterogeneous incentives to search among consumers.
For example, for a range of plausible search cost values, the means predicted page turning
probability, computed separately for page turners and no-turners, are within 2% from the
average search intensity. This result points to some limitations of our model, which provide
directions for future research. First, extend the length of the search process to three pages
and introduce other search strategies, such as sorting by distance and star rating. This woud
allows to include many more observations in the sample and alleviate the selection problem.
Second, increase the amount of consumer heterogeneity, both in priors and in the search cost
distribution. Currently, there are two sources of heterogeneity: parameters of request and
contents of the rst page.
Despite these limitations, our paper makes the rst step in estimating structural models
of search with learning, when detailed data on search histories is available.
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10 Appendix. Tables and gures.
Table 3: Most popular search strategies on kayak.com. The rst column is number
of searches that used a strategy; the second is click rate; then used actions,
in preserved order. Note: 7029 people did nothing, 3499 only ipped pages
N CTR cause1 cause2 cause3 cause4 cause5 cause6 cause7
7029 0.250
1169 0.290 page
899 0.344 page page
869 0.367 sortprice
708 0.422 landmark
427 0.389 page page page
407 0.435 page page page page
289 0.374 page page page page page
271 0.295 lter_price
256 0.297 sortprice page
242 0.248 lter_dist
230 0.317 sortdist
188 0.431 landmark lter_dist
176 0.415 page page page page page page
174 0.293 nbhd
150 0.340 sortprice page page
132 0.417 page page page page page page page
132 0.402 hotelname
117 0.342 lter_price lter_price
114 0.360 landmark page
102 0.284 sortrating
14081 subtotal
10240 0.376 less than 100 searches
24321 0.377 total
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Table 4: Distribution of non-price characteristics of Chicago hotels, by the number
of establishments (stimation sample)
c n nbhd n stars n
null 34 Chinatown 3 1 9
best western 7 Gold Coast, Old Town 51 2 40
hampton inns 6 Loop 22 3 55
holiday inn hotels 6 SW 15 4 42
marriott (all) 6 midway 12 5 2
hilton (all) 5 north side 21
super 8 motels 5 ohare 20
comfort inns 4 west side 3
hyatt (all) 4
Table 5: Comparing samples by parameters of request. First row is the mean,
second row is standard deviation of the variable. The right column is
t-test comparing means of group1 and group4
mean/sd group1 group2 group3 group4 T1-4
obs 17292 2664 1436 1123
advance 18.86 17.56 17.03 16.02 7.64
11.79 12.06 12.14 12.12
weekend 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.56 1.94
0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50
N days 2.41 2.41 2.37 2.32 1.66
1.61 1.74 1.67 1.61
N rooms 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 0.06
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
N guests 1.84 1.81 1.81 1.82 0.70
0.98 0.99 1.00 1.02
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Table 6: Logit estimates of click rates, depending on type of request. The rst row
is the coe¢ cient, the second is t-statistic.
coef/t group1 group2 group3 group4
advance 0.0066 -0.0001 -0.0041 -0.0079
4.73 -0.04 -0.85 -1.43
N days -0.0070 0.0189 0.0763 0.1219
-0.67 0.77 2.17 2.87
weekend -0.0786 -0.0019 -0.0421 -0.1190
-2.33 -0.02 -0.36 -0.90
N rooms -0.0820 -0.2410 -0.0534 -0.1818
-1.22 -1.35 -0.23 -0.67
N guests 0.1240 0.1900 0.1674 0.1538
7.04 4.29 2.78 2.30
N pages 0.0297 0.0482 0.0341 -0.1112
6.41 3.84 0.82 -0.89
const -0.8706 -0.8003 -0.9668 -0.6292
-11.17 -4.04 -3.65 -1.87
Table 7: Characteristics of clicked hotels in groups1-4: mean values and standard
deviations on stars and distance, and percentage shares for neighborhoods.
group1 group2 group3 group4
stars 3.07 2.74 2.59 2.45
0.88 0.89 0.85 0.80
dist 5.00 7.60 9.26 10.95
6.12 6.40 6.10 5.29
Chinatown 4.02 4.17 2.31 3.00
Gold Coast 35.58 21.23 14.81 8.25
Loop 22.99 17.76 14.00 8.25
SW 7.57 16.27 22.31 27.75
midway 5.28 4.56 3.65 3.25
north 6.02 7.34 7.69 7.75
ohare 17.21 27.18 34.00 41.75
west side 1.33 1.49 1.15 0.00
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Table 8: Observed and clicked hotels in the choice sets, % of total
stars obs click nbhd obs click dist obs click
0 0.00 0.00 Chinatown 2.02 3.00 0-5 10.09 20.25
1 10.85 4.50 Gold Coast 4.97 8.25 6-10 2.04 2.50
2 48.91 61.50 Loop 2.44 8.25 10-15 79.23 73.50
3 27.56 19.00 SW 20.59 27.75 16+ 8.65 3.75
4 12.65 15.00 midway 10.56 3.25
5 0.02 0.00 north side 16.10 7.75
ohare 43.16 41.75
west side 36.00 0.00
Table 9: Observed and clicked hotels on the rst and the second page of results
page1 page2
stars obs click obs click
1 13.29 5.61 0.55 0.00
2 53.78 69.47 28.35 30.65
3 22.66 13.40 48.29 50.00
4 10.28 11.53 22.80 19.35
nbhd
Chinatown 1.8 2.8 2.97 1.61
Gold Coast 3.41 4.67 11.55 19.35
Loop 1.51 2.18 6.38 27.42
SW 19.69 32.71 24.4 9.68
midway 9.05 1.87 16.94 11.29
north side 16.54 7.17 14.19 12.9
ohare 47.96 48.6 22.81 17.74
west side 0.04 0 0.76 0
dist
0-5 6.95 9.66 23.32 56.46
6-10 0.77 0.62 7.43 9.68
11-20 92.27 89.72 69.24 33.87
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Table 10: Summary statistics of maximal prices on the rst page, observed by
turners and no turners
percentiles max 4 prices
% no turn turn no turn turn
1 90 90 469 396
5 92 92 479 419
10 95 95 529 421
25 98 98 567 429
50 103 104
75 125 130
90 199 179
95 265 209
99 409 419
Mean 127.34 124.69
Std. Dev. 62.7 50.82
Skewness 3.24 3.41
Kurtosis 15.31 17.75
Obs 848 275
Table 11: Estimation of logit models of demand.
basic with brands and requests
var D1 std D2 std D1 std D2 std
dist -0.55 0.15 -0.74 0.18 -0.66 0.19 -0.71 0.19
stars 1.06 0.09 0.84 0.09 1.01 0.11 0.70 0.10
price -3.91 0.20 -2.85 0.23 -3.14 0.25 -1.55 0.27
n1 0.82 0.31 -0.41 0.43 -0.09 0.44 -0.51 0.44
n2 -0.58 0.29 -1.00 0.48 -0.36 0.44 -0.62 0.44
n3 1.15 0.32 -0.61 0.46 0.69 0.44 -0.05 0.44
out 2.75 0.23 0.41 0.29 2.90 0.48 2.21 0.44
b1 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.28
b2 -1.22 0.30 0.40 0.26
b3 0.86 0.23 0.62 0.23
b4 1.23 0.19 1.37 0.18
b5 2.08 0.24 2.09 0.22
out_nppl -0.23 0.13 -0.26 0.13
out_wnd -0.07 0.24 0.24 0.25
out_adv 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.13
price_wnd 0.08 0.07 -0.13 0.14
logL 2115.84 1711.86 1997.19 1645.64
star 27.17 29.50 32.26 45.27
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Table 12: Estimation results from search models. Results reported only for the
nal specication. The last three rows are dollar values of additional
star, of median search cost and its sdandard deviation.
Var SNL sd SL sd
dist -0.63 0.18 -0.60 0.18
stars 0.47 0.08 0.50 0.08
price -1.00 0.16 -1.05 0.17
n1 -0.42 0.41 -0.48 0.42
n2 -0.50 0.41 -0.58 0.42
n3 0.19 0.41 0.07 0.42
out 2.53 0.31 2.53 0.30
b1 0.68 0.26 0.67 0.26
b2 0.49 0.24 0.47 0.24
b3 0.62 0.22 0.63 0.22
b4 1.45 0.17 1.43 0.17
b5 2.40 0.18 2.34 0.18
out_nppl -0.13 0.16 -0.17 0.15
out_wnd 0.31 0.25 0.30 0.25
out_adv 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.13
price_wnd -0.16 0.16 -0.16 0.16
c0 -1.31 2.24 -1.38 1.87
c1 0.82 2.13 0.81 1.52
beta0 0.31 0.46
beta1 0.23 0.12 0.06
beta2 -0.26 -0.02 0.05
theta 0.00 1.23E-04 7.80E-06
logL 2273.01 2258.13 0.00
star 47.20 48.08
cost_med 26.89 60.16 23.94 44.67
cost_sd 32.11 28.02
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Figure 1: Distribution of distances to the city center (in miles) of Chicago hotels
(estimation sample)
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Figure 2: Geographical position of Chicago hotels
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Figure 3: Quantiles (10%, 90%) of hotel prices, observed on the rst page (for
each hotel separately). The y-axis is measured in hundreds of dollars.
Centered around median.
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Figure 4: Normal quantile plot, residuals from regression of logarithm of price on
distance and star rating.
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Figure 5: Proportions of rst pages at which individual hotels were displayed, es-
timation sample. In total, 118 hotels on 1123 observed rst pages.
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Figure 6: Empirical CDF of prices of hotels <5 miles from city center, seen on the
rst page by turners and no-turners
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Figure 7: Empirical CDF of prices of hotels with 3 stars and more, seen on the
rst page by turners and no-turners
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Figure 8: Distribution of search costs and gains from search for a representative
consumer, model SNL (basic specication)
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Figure 9: Reservation utitlities and predicted probabilities of page turning for var-
ious models.
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Figure 10: Histogram of average hotel prices, predicted by posterior beliefs across
consumers (after they observe the rst page).
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